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Abstract. 
A trusted portable computing device and its security mechanism were presented to solve the security issues, such as 
the attack of virus and Trojan horse, the lost and stolen of storage device, in mobile office. It used smart card to build 
a trusted portable security base, virtualization to create a secure virtual execution environment, two-factor 
authentication mechanism to identify legitimate users, and dynamic encryption to protect data privacy. The security 
environment described in this paper is characteristic of portability, security and reliability.  It can meet the security 
requirement of mobile office. 
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1. Introduction  
As the rapidly development of E-Commerce, E-Government, people have strong demand for Mobile 
Office to handle business or government affairs anytime and anywhere without carrying a heavy portable 
laptop. These requirements reflect in two aspects: mobile office environment and data security. On the 
premise of data security, people can do their work in a familiar environment in any computer, which bring 
about the change from briefcase plus laptop computer to “thumb” like disk in mobile office model. And 
this becomes a hot research field of Information Security Technology. 
The method of directly loading pocket operating system and other mobile application in the CD or 
USB storage device has been used for several years, aiming to construct a portable computing 
environment. Because of its small size, high storage capacity and fast I/O rate, the USB storage device 
becomes an ideal candidate of PCE carrier. Nowadays, the third-generation mobile storage device has 
been featured with portable personal working environment. It has integrated with a variety of applications 
and can be compatible with multiple platforms. And more importantly, it has some security protection 
ability. The sales of USB Flash Device will increase 15% per year through the year 2010, according to 
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Gartner’s research [1], and the smart drives will take 74% market share of UFDs then. The revenues for 
smart UFDs will grow at 96% CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) through 2010. In this situation, 
several smart UFD (just like PCE) products are developed at home and abroad, such as U3ǃDriver 
Alliance and ceedo. However, the security and reliability of such PCEs is based on the security of the 
operating systems. Once the OS was compromised by the virus and Trojan horse, the data security in such 
PCEs will be threatened. 
In order to solve the security issues in portable computing environment fundamentally, we proposed a 
next generation mobile storage device: Trusted Portable Computing Device (TPCD). The Trusted 
Portable Computing Environment (TPCE) is built on TPCD, such as USB flash storage device, SD Card 
and TF card, relying on trusted computing and virtualization, and can run on specific operating systems 
such as Windows or Linux. TPCD is comprised of trusted hardware, trusted environment and trusted 
application. By constructing a closed virtual execution environment, TPCD can guarantee the security of 
user operation and user data. Also, it can prevent the attack from untrusted host environment. It is 
interesting to note that the whole running process will not leave any traces on the host PC. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the architecture of trusted portable computing 
Environment. Section 3 describes the secure virtual execution environment. Section 4 describes the key 
security technologies used in this paper. Section 5 analyzes this paper and section 6 makes a conclusion. 
2. System Architecture  
The TPCD Architecture as showed in figure 1 is designed based on hierarchical model. This 
architecture is featured with portability, flexibility and robustness. Based on the hardware-level security 
component TPSB, TPCE can guarantee the safety and reliability of each component. As trusted 
computing only defines the specification of Trusted Platform Module, it doesn’t provide a fine-grained 
security mechanism. The flexibility of the TPCE reflects in the cutting and optimization of TPM and 
provides more fine-grained security mechanism. Robustness is an important indicator to measure a good 
architecture. By cutting and optimizing a virtual machine monitor, we built a lightweight virtual machine 
monitor, which can improve the stability of TPCE. In addition, the continuity and controllability of the 
security service, the lifecycle of the portable application are all reflected in the portability of TPCE. 
 
Figure 1. Architecture of TPCD 
2.1 Hardware Layer 
Hardware layer is the foundation of TPCE architecture, which is comprised of the host computer’s 
hardware resources (including CPU, memory and monitor) and TPCD. As a carrier of personal mobile 
office environment, TPCD just needs a host computer which can run Windows normally. When 
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connecting via the USB interface, TPCE will automatically load into the computer, and display on the 
monitor. 
Referred to the Trusted Execution Module [2] and the implementation of ȝTPM [3], we implemented 
the Trusted Portable Security Base chip with TPM functionality based on smart card technology. The 
TPSB can provide series of basic cryptographic functionalities: random number generation, hashing, the 
security storage of sensitive data, asymmetric encryption and decryption, and signature generation, etc. 
These basic functionalities can be used to achieve a number of security services. 
2.2 Host Operating System  
In this paper, we mainly choose Windows XP or later versions as a host operating system. The trusted 
virtual machine monitor runs in the host operating system independently. 
2.3 Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor 
According to the requirements of portability and security, we have cut the TVMM referred to method 
provide by [4]. Most of the device call requests reach the host operating systems directly bypassing the 
TVMM; the TVMM only monitors the memory and I/O access. As TPCE only supported one desktop 
environment, the number of virtual machine supported by TVMM is set to one. In this case, we can cut 
more codes for resources sharing between virtual machines and so on. TVMM provides security service 
interface to TPSB chip, and implements user security management, security storage management, 
network security management and other basic functions. 
User security management is responsible for authentication and authorization. Only authorized user 
can enter the secure virtual execution environment and access the data in TPCD. 
Security storage management manages user data in TPCD, and maintains the security of portable 
applications and data. In TPCD, the storage space is divided into security area, application area and 
ordinary area. All the data in security area is encrypted by the master key, and security area is used for 
storing system data and user confidential information. Portable application and temporary data are stored 
in application area. There is no need to encrypt such data, and these data only need access control. 
Ordinary area services like a common storage device. Ordinary data without security requirement is 
stored here. 
Network security management is responsible for networking based on secure communication protocol, 
such as IPSec, VPN. It enables TPCD with safety network transmission capacity. 
2.4 Security Container 
Here, we call the virtual environment provided by TVMM security container. The portable 
applications and client management application are run in the security container. Security container and 
TVMM form the secure virtual execution environment. In the next section, we will describe the secure 
virtual execution environment in detail. 
3. Secure Virtual Execution Environment 
The secure virtual execution environment (SVEE) is composed of TVMM and the security container 
which is running above TVMM. By implementing virtual registry and virtual file system, SVEE provides 
each application with necessary resources. This can reduce the dependency on host operating system. API 
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call monitoring is used to intercept resources request from application, and the request will redirect to the 
virtual resources in TPCD. 
 
Figure 2. Secure Virtual Execution Environment 
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the secure operating environment. The left part describes TPCE 
running in host OS, the right part describes the structure of TPCD and the data storage situation. After 
startup, user can load their configure preferences and application, such as wallpaper, home page, 
bookmarks and so on. Due to the personalized computing environment, it will be much more 
conveniently for the user. Meanwhile, the device event monitor module, security login module, registry 
monitor module and file access filter module are all loaded into the secure execution environment. 
When monitoring the power on event of TPCD, the device event monitor will call the secure login 
module to start the login dialog. After authentication, the client management application will be run. User 
can manage their data, install and uninstall applications by this application. 
In OS kernel, registry API and file system API is called by the application in user mode to access the 
registry and file system. In order to achieve portability, we added registry monitor module and file access 
filter module into the TVMM. When applications in SVEE request to access system resources, TVMM 
intercepts their call to the API, and then redirect the access request to the virtual resources in SVEE. 
Registry monitor module is used for monitoring the creation, deletion, or modification of the registry 
keys. When an application in SVEE tries to modify the registry, the registry monitor module will provide 
a virtual registration to the application. All the operations on the registry will reflect in the virtual registry. 
So the running of TPCD will leave no traces in the host computers. The function of the file access filter 
module is similar to the registry monitor module. It provides a virtual file system which is used for 
dynamic encryption when an application accesses data in the security area. 
4. Security Issues 
In the process of implementing TPCD, several key security technologies were used to ensure user 
login and the security of user secret data. 
4.1 Two-factor Authentication 
Being implemented in USB storage device, TPCD is featured with a small size, which brings 
convenience to users, but also brings some security risks: the lost and stolen of TPCD. Therefore, a novel 
two-factor authentication scheme is adopted in the project: user password and U-Key online 
authentication. Only the one who can provide the correct password and un-revoked U-Key certificate can 
login and access data in TPCD. If the TPCD was lost or stolen, user can apply for revocation of the U-
Key certificate to the security server, making sure to prevent unauthorized data access. The authentication 
process is described as follows: 
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Step 1 ,UID PSWUSER TPCDo : 
TPCD auto runs when power on. A login dialog box is popped up, user enter the accountUID and the 
password PSW . TPSB calculates the hash value ( )H PSW , and then verifies the securely stored user 
information. Only after that can go to next step, otherwise terminates and return. If user enters the wrong 
password three times, the TPCD will be locked. After verification, a mutual authentication is carried out 
between TPCD and the security server SS. 
Step 2 1 1|| ( )SKTPCDM Sig MTPCD SSo : 
TPSB generates a random number TR , and then encrypts the message with pre-distributed shared-key:  
1 ( || || ( ))ShareK TM E R UID H PSW . Next, TPSB signs the message with the private key which extracts 
from the certificate in U-Key: 1( )TPCDSKSig M . Finally, TPCD sends the signature and the message 1M  to 
security server. 
Step 3 2 2|| ( )SKSSM Sig MSS TPCDo : 
When receiving the message, the security server (SS) operates as follows: 
1) SS decrypts the message 1M  and extracts UID  and ( )H PSW . According to UID  and ( )H PSW , 
SS searches the MetaData of the user, and extracts user certificate from it. After that, SS verifies the 
validity of the certificate, and then checks whether the certificate is in the Certificate Revocation List. If 
not, goes to 2), otherwise terminates the authentication.
2) SS extracts the public key TPCDPK  from certificate and verifies the signature on 1M . If succeeds, 
goes to next step, otherwise terminates the process.
3) SS generates a random number SSR and a new message that encrypts with shared-key: 
2 ( || || )ShareK T SSM E R R UID . Subsequently, SS signs 2M with its private key. Then, SS sends them to 
TPCD.
Step 4 3 3|| ( )SKSSM Sig MTPCD SSo : 
On the receipt of the message, TPCD will do the following operation: 
1) TPSB verifies thesignature on 2M  with the public key SSPK of secure server. If succeeds, goes to 2), 
otherwise prompts error message. 
2) TPSB decrypts 3M , extracts TR and SSR . Then compares the TR to the previous one. If equals, it 
means that the TPCD communicates to the right secure server and can go to the next step. 
3) TPCD generates a session key iK  and a timestamp T , then encrypts the message with iK : 
3 ( || || || )ShareK SS iM E R K T UID . After signing it, TPCD sends it to SS.  
Step 5 4 4|| ( )SKSSM Sig MSS TPCDo : 
After receiving the message from TPCD, SS will do the following four operations: 
1) Verifies the signature on 3M . 
2) By checking the timestamp, SS verifies the fresh of the session key. It can be calculated as the 
following formula: CurrentT T t ' . In the formula, CurrentT  is the current local time of SS, t'  is the 
expected network delay time, and T is the timestamp.  
3) By comparing the SSR  that is extracted from the decrypted 3M  to the previous sent one, SS can 
prevent replay attack from malicious TPCD.  
4) SS extracts the unlock parameter G, the large prime number p from MetaData, then encrypts them 
with iK : 4 ( || || )iKM E UID G p . Subsequently, SS signs it and sends it to TPCD. 
Step 6: 
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In this step, TPCD generates the master key which is used for decrypting and encrypting the data in the 
encrypted area of the TPCD. The master key is generates as follows: modPSWMK G p . Then, the 
master key is stored in the security area of TPSB. When TPCD power off, the master key is cleared. 
4.2 Dynamic Encryption 
In order to facilitate user operation, and not change user habits, the data in security area is encrypted 
and decrypted dynamically with the master key MK . The whole process is showed in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Dynamic Encryption  
When writing data to the security area, TVMM will intercept the write command of the application, 
then generates an APDU command to encrypt the writing data in TPSB. After encryption, TVMM gets 
the encrypted data returned form TPSB, and then writes it to the security area. The read command is the 
same as the write command. When an application wants to read data in security area, TVMM intercepts 
the read command at first. Then, TVMM reads the encrypted data at the specified location in security area. 
By responding the APDU command, TPSB decrypts the data and returns it to the TVMM. Finally, 
TVMM returns the decrypted data to the application. As the dynamic encryption and decryption is 
transparent to the applications in security container, authorized user can directly access the data in TPCD 
just as the data is not encrypted. 
5. Security Analysis 
The proposed Trusted Portable Computing Device architecture mainly has following security features: 
1) The safety of certificates and keys˖All the certificates and keys are stored in trusted portable 
security base. The TPSB is constructed based on smart card technology, so it is engineered to be tamper 
resistant [6]. It can resist a series of physical attacks, such as differential power analysis and physical 
disassembly. All the encryption and decryption, signature operations are completed in TBSP, this can 
effectively prevent the disclosure of the private key. 
2) Two-factor authentication: By using password and U-Key online authentication approach to 
identify the owner of TPCD, it can ensure the login of legal user. In order to implement the entity 
authentication between the security server and TPCD, a mutual authentication protocol is proposed to 
prevent spoofing, so the attacker can not fake TPCD or security server to steal login information. When 
losing TPCD, user can request the security server to revoke the digital certificate. Even if the attacker can 
crack the password by brute force, he still can not complete the certificate verification to obtain login 
information to generate master key. 
3) Data security: User security data is dynamically encrypted and stored in the security area of TPCD, 
and the master key is auto cleared after power off, so it is impossible to steal the master key. The key 
generation parameters G and p are stored in security server, and the master key generation process will 
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use the password. In this situation, even the security server is compromised, the attacker still can not get 
the master key without knowing the password.
6. Conclusion 
For the security problems in mobile office environment, this paper proposed a next generation mobile 
storage device: trusted portable computing devices. The device uses the existing mobile storage device 
such as USB storage device, SD card or TF card as a carrier, relying on the smart card to provide security 
functions, and applying virtualization to provide a trusted portable computing environment in the existing 
operating systems. Trusted portable computing device is comprised of the trusted hardware, trusted 
environment and trusted mobile applications, the users can enter the trusted environment only when they 
pass the two-factor authentication system. And the applications can access security data through the 
dynamic encryption technology provided by the TVMM layer.  The TPCD not only has high portability, 
reliability and security, but also solves the security issues caused by lost or stolen. 
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